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LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AND THE QUESTION OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
 





Frank Michelman’s essay “Legitimacy, the Social Turn, and Constitutional Review: What 
Political Liberalism Suggests”1 examines the conditions under which political liberalism (and 
liberal constitutional review) can be reconciled with the insistence that governmental 
compliance with social security demands of citizens be subject to constitutional norms. 
According to Michelman, the conditions are fourfold, and all of them would need to be in place 
for liberal constitutional review to be reconcilable with constitutional social security demands. 
The four conditions are these: 
 
1) Political liberalism considers governmental compliance with certain social security demands 
an essential element of moral justice. 
 
2) Political liberalism considers governmental compliance with certain social security demands 
an essential element of minimum requirements of governmental legitimacy. 
 
3) Political liberalism considers inclusion of some social security demands in the fundamental 
rights framework of liberal democracies necessary. Such inclusion would turn these demands 
into “rights,” at least in a broad political sense of the word. 
 
4) Political liberalism considers all social security demands included in the fundamental rights 
framework of liberal democracies justiciable by a judiciary or similar institutional forum. 
Justiciability turns these demands – at best considered broad political rights up to this point – 
into concrete legal rights (depending, of course, on the outcome of the case, as we shall see 
below). 
 
Especially the fourth condition raises fundamental concerns which Michelman gathers up 
under the label of the “standard worry.” The “standard worry” is the worry that justiciable 
social security demands – or “socio-economic rights” as these demands would be definable, 
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now in the narrow sense of the word “right” – would “force the American judiciary … into a 
hapless choice between usurpation and abdication, from which there would be no escape 
without either embarrassment or discreditation.” The “usurpation” of concern here is 
usurpation of governmental powers that the court, in view of its institutional design, does not 
have. The “abdication” invoked concerns abdication of judicial powers that the court does have 
and can be expected to exercise in view of its institutional design. As Michelman puts it: Down 
the path of usurpation lies the prospect of “resented [judicial attempts] to reshuffle the most 
basic resource-management priorities of the public household against the prevailing political 
will.” Down the path of abdication looms large a “debasement” of the “entire currency of rights 
and the rule of law – the 
spectacle of courts openly ceding to executive and legislative bodies a non-reviewable 
privilege of indefinite postponement of a declared constitutional right.”2 
 
This, then, is the problem with which Michelman’s “legitimation by constitution” argument 
(following him, I will call it the LBC argument from now on) takes issue. And his endeavour 
is to inquire whether LBC may be considered feasible in the case of socio-economic rights 
(SER hereafter; the combination of LBC and SER will henceforth also be denoted with LBC x 
SER) in view of a modest and experimental form of judicial review that has been championed 
pervasively in recent constitutional theory debates. This new experimentalism in judicial 
review proposes a method by means of which we might eventually – in the course of time – 
get over the double pronged hurdle of the standard worry. Here is how Michelman describes 
the proposed method: 
 
The court acts in the first instance as instigator and non-dictatorial overseer of engagements among stakeholders 
very broadly defined, among whom state actors hold no privileged position, in an ongoing process of interpretative 
clarification of what a constitutionally declared right of (say) “access to health care services” consists of in 
substance and, simultaneously and reciprocally, of what sorts of steps by what classes of actors are concretely (in 
the current conditions of society, economy, and so on) now in order toward the achievement of due and adequate 
service to everyone’s core interest – a process of successively clarified “benchmarking” as it is sometimes called. 
As the discursive benchmarking moves along and the emerging answers gain public recognition and authorization, 
the court might turn up the heat on deployment of its powers of review. At a relatively early stage, what the court 
presumes to dictate will be agendas of questions to be addressed and answered by one or another stakeholder 
group or class. At later stages, the court starts calling for substantive compliance with an emergent best-practice 
consensus, in the name of the constitutional right (say) to access to health care services. The screws tighten on 
what can count as a reasonable, sincere governmental response. The court serves as arbiter but it never has or 
claims a door-closing last word.3 
 
It is through this experimental and initially weak-form of judicial review that constitutional 
scholars have been seeking and/or claiming to secure the fourth domino of justiciability that 
LBC would require before it can be extended to SER. If the justiciability domino cannot be 
secured in this way, argues Michelman, it would terminate the whole LBC x SER endeavour. 
If the fourth domino would topple over, it would also knock back the first three – justice, 
legitimacy and constitutionalisation – or at least render them meaningless as far as an effective 
LBC x SER scheme is concerned. 
 
What we have described so far can be regarded as the first and perhaps main focus point of 
Michelman’s paper. However, the paper also has a second focus point that hinges on the first. 
Should the LBC x SER endeavour indeed come to gain stable ground through this 
experimentalist mode of judicial review, it can be expected to reflect and contribute to an 
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ascendancy of normative or legal over political constitutionalism. Here is Michelman’s key 
observation regarding this point: 
 
I now introduce an arguable manifestation of a spread of LBC in the constitutional-cultural rain-water, which I 
can only start up here for further pursuit in work still to come. I have in mind the question of the pending demise 
of Britain’s political constitution. Deeply anchored in the British past as has been the boast and the fame – and no 
doubt the wisdom and the success – of that country’s special sort of constitutional arrangement, it seems the idea 
of a “political”- not -“legal” constitution began some years ago to fall away in parts of the Commonwealth 
hinterland, and today the waves of change more than lap at the shores of the sceptered isle. Do we see here the 
signs of a spread of LBC in the local and global constitutional imaginations?4 
 
This suggestion regarding the ascendency of LBC over LBP (Legitimation by Politics) across 
the world in recent times would of course seem to gain added sting should the LBC x SER 
argument outlined above prove watertight, for resistance to the justiciability of SER may well 
be said to constitute one of the last remnants of political constitutional resistance – and a very 
significant one at that – within frameworks of legal constitutionalism. Cogent justiciability of 
SER would dispel one of the last bastions of constitutionally warranted non-justiciable politics 
within legal constitutions, might one say. It is no wonder then that Michelman would choose 
an argument regarding the feasibility of LBC x SER as a platform for raising the point regarding 
the demise of political constitutions. LBC x SER, if feasible, would effectively pull the plug 
on political constitutionalism for it would deal a fatal blow to the idea of constitutionally non-
justiciable politics. 
 
More elements of Michelman’s paper will be touched upon in this response to his exploration 
of the new experimentalist conception of LBC x SER that has come to the fore in recent 
constitutional scholarship, but the outline of his argument above provides one with a sufficient 
point of departure. Starting with this point of departure, the response will proceed as follows. 
It will begin – in Section II – by constructing a genealogy of the LBC x SER argument in 
Michelman’s thought. It will become clear from this genealogy that the LBC x SER argument 
that Michelman offers us here can be considered as the latest development in a remarkable 
history of interesting shifts. It will continue – in Section III – by sketching a profile of 
Michelman’s “left-leaning liberal constitutional theory.” The first aim of this sketch will be to 
show how Michelman insists on the positive and constructive relation between “left-leaning” 
and “liberal” and dismisses the irreconcilable rift between these two inclinations that many 
take for granted. But the sketch has a broader aim. The broader aim is to show how 
Michelman’s liberal constitutional theory ultimately remains – notwithstanding his own 
observations regarding the ascendency of legal over political constitutionalism, and 
notwithstanding his charitable presentation of the LBC x SER argument as part and parcel of 
this ascendancy5 – a political constitutional theory. 
 
At this point the sketch will also take issue with Martin Loughlin’s response to Michelman in 
this volume. Paradoxically, it will show that Loughlin’s political constitutional response to 
Michelman – the essence of which consists in the insistence that Constitutions are underpinned 
by historical political practices and not by abstract normative principles – may similarly be 
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the consideration that accuracy – an accurate assessment of his position – would demand this care. 
much more legal and normative than may be apparent at first glance. In the process, that is, by 
pointing out the political nature of Michelman’s “legal constitutionalism”6 and the legal nature 
of Loughlin’s political constitution, I hope to give effect to a sobering deconstruction of the 
binary opposition between political and legal constitutionalism. The suggestion is not, 
however, that it is Michelman and Loughlin who are in need of this sobering deconstruction. 
In their own ways, I think, they are both aware of the instability of the distinction that they are 
employing. I take them both to understand well that the distinction at best reflects a certain 
strategic or preferential emphasis. The fish that my deconstruction of the opposition between 
the political and the legal constitution aims to fry is the aberrational conflation of these 
opposites in a context that has in recent years given considerable cause for much apprehension 
regarding LBC x SER arguments. The engagement with Michelman and Loughlin aims to show 
that the ultimate question is not whether we are heading for a political or a legal constitution, 
but what kind of political constitution we are heading for, one that hides its own politics under 
the guise of legality, or one that recognises legality as an essential but non-exhaustive condition 
of its legitimacy.  
 
My argument then turns to Mark Tushnet’s suggestion that those in support of Michelman’s 
LBC x SER argument would need to back up this support with an adequate institutional 
imagination of how it might come to function. Section IV takes up this challenge with a plea to 
reconsider the classical constitutional democratic imagination – that used to prevail before a 
juristocratic constitutional imagination increasingly began to displace it in the course of the 
twentieth century – provides one with an adequate institutional conception of LBC x SER. If 
the ascendancy of legal constitutionalism over political constitutionalism that Michelman 
observes would turn out to be too close a cousin of the ascendancy of this juristocratic 
constitutional imagination, one would have grave reasons for not courting her and for returning 
LBC x SER to a proper political constitutionalism that still meets Michelman’s four 
requirements for LBC x SER, but does so with some qualifications. In fact the argument must 
then become, as I point out in the last paragraphs of this paper, an argument for DLBC 
generally, and DLBC x SER specifically, that is, Delegitimation by Constitution with regard 
to all constitutional rights, as well as Delegitimation by Constitution with regard to SER.  
 
II. TOWARDS A GENEALOGY OF MICHELMAN’S LBC X SER ARGUMENT. 
 
During the early years of his long and productive career as one of the leading constitutional 
theorists of the 20th century, Michelman published a series of articles that took an unflinching 
stance in favour of a justiciable constitutional guarantee of certain basic welfare benefits, the 
ensemble of which benefits constituted a constitutionally guaranteed “social minimum.” This 
was a time in which the United States Supreme Court (USSC hereafter) sought to sustain a 
constitutionally guaranteed social minimum through the equal protection guarantees of the 14th 
Amendment in order to avoid substantive due process distillations of social rights from the text 
of the Bill of Rights. In his first response to the USSC’s jurisprudence at the time, Michelman 
noted the Court’s substantive due process worries, but nevertheless proposed recognition of an 
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independent social minimum guarantee as a more promising approach to the problem, given 
the way positive recognition of an independent social minimum guarantee would spare the 
Court the difficulty of justifying strict scrutiny as far as equal protection of the poor is 
concerned, considering that poverty did not constitute an invidious classification that warranted 
strict review.7 
 
The substantive due process contents of his own proposal did not seem to worry Michelman 
much in this first response to the question of justiciable social minimum guarantees, but a 
second article from this period already appears somewhat more cautious in this regard. In this 
second article he would base the argument for a justiciable social minimum guarantee on John 
Ely’s conception of the “representation-reinforcing” demands of the United States 
Constitution. Ely’s notion of the “representation-reinforcing” demands of the Constitution 
turned on the assertion that the Constitution demanded that democratic decision-making 
processes be fully representative, not only formally so (in the sense that everyone can in 
principle take part in electoral processes), but also substantively (in the sense that everyone 
should enjoy the actual ability and liberty that conditions meaningful participation in electoral 
processes). Dire poverty, argued Michelman, destroys this actual ability to take part 
meaningfully in democratic decision-making procedures. As such, it distorted political 
representation significantly; hence the need for a social minimum that would rectify or at least 
minimise this distortion.8 
 
However, considerable caution regarding the substantive due process implications of this 
“representation-reinforcing” thesis evidently began to bother Michelman towards the end of 
this argument. He articulated this caution with reference to Wesley Hohfeld and we shall return 
to this reference below. Suffice it to observe now that the caution that he articulated towards 
the end of his “representation-reinforcing” argument in favour of a constitutionally guaranteed 
social minimum in 1979, can clearly be traced to an engagement with the political theory of 
John Rawls in an article published in 1973. Rawls’ Theory of Justice, published in 1971, made 
a strong case for a social minimum guarantee as an essential element of political justice. But 
already here Rawls would express significant doubt as to whether such a guarantee can ever 
attain the status of a justiciable right. And it is on this doubt that Michelman picked up when 
he published this passage in 1973: 
 
Given Rawlsian premises, acceptance of judicial review thus reflects a belief that it is possible and useful to 
cultivate a special capacity for evaluating the compliance of legislative action (inaction) with principles of justice 
or their derived constitutional embodiments, and for persuading the generality of citizens to recognise 
discrepancies when they occur.9 
 
The bother that Rawls raises here, according to Michelman, is this one: Justiciability cannot 
turn on the mere endorsement of a principle of justice or its derived constitutional 
embodiments. It must be accompanied by the capacity for “persuading the generality of citizens 
to recognise discrepancies when they occur.” Judicial review demands a judicial capacity that 
is generally able to persuade citizens that a derogation from a principle of justice or a 
constitutional right has occurred, and judges evidently lack this capacity in the case of social 
minimum guarantees. They dispose of no external principle with reference to which recognition 
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of derogations from social minimum guarantees can generally be expected from more or less 
all citizens. As Michelman puts it: 
 
[T]he court lacks modes of articulation and explanation under which it can decide the case and maintain its 
appearance of answering to external principle, the moral source of its influence on other parts of government.10 
 
As we saw above, Michelman would take another shot at arguing for a justiciable social 
minimum guarantee in 1979, but this Rawlsian caution, articulated in 1973, would ultimately 
inform the position he would take on the justiciability of social minimum guarantees for many 
years to come. Ironically, Rawls himself would eventually change tack. He expressly turned to 
the early Michelman and accordingly began to argue for the justiciability of social minimum 
guarantees from his side.11 But Michelman would stick to the Rawlsian line he picked up in 
1973 for many years and would instead begin to find it necessary to explain meticulously why 
it still makes sense to have something like a non-justiciable social minimum guarantee 
embodied in a Constitution. One might say that this was his way out of the “abdication” part 
of the “standard worry” pointed out above. Acceptance of non-justiciability, one might 
understand him to have argued eventually, does not as such imply judicial abdication in the 
face of positively embodied constitutional rights in a way that makes a mockery of these rights. 
This is so because some rights or “rights” (the addition of the scarecrows will become clear 
below) can be understood plausibly as embodiments of political constitutional aspirations to 
which politicians can be held accountable, without raising expectations of judicial 
enforcement.12  
 
In other words, worries about judicial abdication cannot be an issue in the absence of any 
expectation of judicial enforcement, argued Michelman until very recently, and we have no 
clear reason to believe that he has changed his position significantly in this regard in the essay 
published in this volume. What is significantly new in this new essay, however, is his careful 
analysis and scrutiny of the conditions of possibility that would have to be fulfilled if one would 
want to extend LBC to SER. Those who would want to extend LBC to SER, would have to 
face up to the challenge that the requirement of justiciability – the crucial fourth domino – 
poses in this regard. Non-justiciability of constitutional social minimum guarantees, 
Michelman argues in this volume, will knock back all of the first three dominoes in the LBC 
argument as far as SER are concerned and the principal aim of his essay is to explore recent 
suggestions in constitutional scholarship that this fatal knocking-back is not necessary. 
 
These, then, are the roads on which Michelman’s SER journey has taken him thus far. This is 
the genealogy of the SER position that he has developed in recent essays and the background 
of the task that he sets himself in his essay in this volume. Let us now take a look at the general 
constitutional theoretical profile that emerged from these travels. 
 
III. ALWAYS UNDER LAW: PROFILE OF A LEFT-LEANING LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY.  
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“Always under law” is the beginning of a title of an article that Michelman published in 1995.13 
In what follows I wish to take the phrase “always under law” as an apt denotation of two 
constructivist features of Michelman’s general constitutional theory. The first feature concerns 
a basic theoretical constructivism regarding the normative origins of law. The second concerns 
a basic theoretical constructivism concerning the reach of law’s normativity. The first 
constructivism I will call Jeffersonian and Kelsenian. The second I will call Hohfeldian. The 
Kelsenian constructivism concerns an argument regarding time. At issue here is a temporal 
constructivism. The second concerns an argument regarding space. At issue here is a spatial 
constructivism. Of concern then is the time and space of law as Michelman sees it. These are 
the basic coordinates of his left-leaning liberal constitutional theoretical profile. Or so I will 
argue. 
 
Michelman’s Jeffersonian and Kelsenian constructivism 
 
As far as I know, Michelman has never presented his theoretical position as “Kelsenian,” nor 
has he expressly compared the profile of his own work with the work of Kelsen. The Kelsenian 
constructivism that I will outline below is therefore imputed to Michelman. It is a reading of 
his work that may well not be shared by himself, nor by others. I nevertheless propose this 
Kelsenian reading of Michelman to come to terms with an apparent paradox in his work. On 
the one hand, Michelman’s work is consistently historicist and non-metaphysical. On the other 
hand, he steadfastly takes recourse to normative foundations of law that make law what it is, 
the normative foundations that distinguish law from mere contingent and historical exercises 
of power. I will unpack this paradox below by first looking at the historicist or non-
metaphysical side of Michelman’s work, and then to its normative side. The Kelsenian 
constructionism that I will be imputing to him is a proposal as to how one might reconcile these 
two sides of his work. In the final analysis, however, this Kelsenian constructivism also seals 
and stamps his work as ultimately more political than normative, as was the case with Kelsen’s 
own normativism.14 For reasons that will become clear, I will also refer to this Kelsenian 
constructivism as a Jeffersonian constructivism. 
 
The political or historicist basis of Michelman’s work can be distilled from many more of his 
writings than the few with which one can engage here. The essay “Law’s Republic” of 1988 
would always be a good place to start, because of the way in which it expressly grapples with 
undeniable evidence of fundamental normative shifts in the jurisprudence of the USSC that 
render the underlying normativity of American constitutional law conspicuously “contingent” 
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and “historical.” This contingency, proposed Michelman in “Law’s Republic,” is a reflection 
of “encounter[s] with otherness” that afford the American people opportunities for 
“transformative self-renewal.”15 Three other writings from 1986, 1999 and 2000 that 
respectively dealt with the theoretical positions of Duncan Kennedy, Jürgen Habermas and 
Michel Rosenfeld, provide one with further evidence of Michelman’s historicism. 
Michelman’s response to Habermas engaged with the latter’s project of a constitutional 
patriotism that would turn on purely procedural constitutional principles, principles that for 
reasons of their pure proceduralism do not impose substantive values on any one and can 
therefore expect endorsement from all citizens. Moreover, citizens should endorse these 
normative principles, argued Habermas, because they are intrinsic to the basic communicative 
aspirations on which they themselves rely when they engage in normative argument.16 
Michelman was not convinced by Habermas’ claims in this regard. According to him, the 
communicative principles that Habermas invoked to found a universal normativity derived 
from a language or a culture in which honest rational argument is valued as a substantive ethical 
principle. Habermas was therefore wrong to believe that he could rid the procedural 
normativity that he derived from the theory of communicative action from the contingent 
cultural values – the substance – that underpinned them.17 
 
The acceptance of contingency and historicity that underpinned Michelman’s response to 
Habermas was even more evident in his responses to Kennedy and Rosenfeld. Responding to 
Kennedy’s notion of the fundamental contradiction that underpins the law and renders it 
irreducibly indeterminate and contingent, Michelman claimed allegiance to the fundamental 
contradiction and avowed it as a friend and even as part and parcel of his very selfhood. It was 
therefore not something that was fearful and painful and it did not as such render the liberal 
conception of law pathological. To the contrary, the fundamental contradiction was exactly that 
which gives the law its specific dignity: Here is how he phrased his response.  
 
That there is something like the fundamental contradiction deeply written into us, and that the result is a radically 
disunified legal discourse, is the truth as I understand it. Yet…Kennedy’s diagnosis of liberal legal pathology rests 
on the claim that the contradiction is, for us, an experience fearful and painful. That is not how it seems to me. I 
think the contradiction is my friend; nay my self.18 
  
Responding to Rosenfeld’s assertion regarding the irreducible contingency and political 
contentiousness of all legal interpretation in the multi-cultural contexts of postmodern 
societies, Michelman again accepted the claim without reservation, but added that it is not 
necessary to make too much of a fuss about this contingency. It was not a new problem, he 
said, and certainly not just a “postmodern” phenomenon. It was as old as legal interpretation 
itself. It was a “chronic affliction,” “like mice in the attic,” “at least as old as the house of 
constitutional government.”19 “It is a condition,” moreover, “that history and experience tell us 
is manageable without tears.” “(Got mice? Get a cat and learn to like it.)”20 So here again could 
one see Michelman cheerfully embracing the contingency of legal interpretation and the 
irreducible margins of politics of interpretation concomitant to this contingency.  
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20 Ibid. 
 
Whether the contingency and the politics of legal interpretation is always as manageable 
without tears as Michelman suggested here is a question we need not pose here. Suffice it to 
stress that he endorsed Rosenfeld’s claim that the “universal claims” of abstract normative 
principles such as “human rights” do not spare us but involve us in contingency and politics 
the moment that we seek to apply them in concrete cases. The meaning of these universal norms 
always turn vague, and become irreducibly supportive of conflicting claims when concrete 
decisions are required. And on this point Michelman would also find it necessary to take issue 
with the Rawlsian belief that the legitimacy of coercive human rights regimes can be more or 
less complete; complete in the sense that “almost all questions regarding applications of 
[essential basic rights entrenchments] or at least their ‘central ranges’ can be resolved cogently, 
by reasoned arguments referring to values publicly known to underlie the constitution.”21 
Rawls would accordingly base the possibility of a “reasonable pluralism of comprehensive 
views” on this faith that differences between comprehensive worldviews could be settled 
reasonably in a core area of public reason, that is, a core area where disputes regarding the 
central ranges of human rights claims can be solved “cogently by reasoned argument.” 
Michelman would insist to the contrary:  
 
[Any] …legal entrenchment of a specified set of rights must always be liable to controversy in a modern, plural, 
democratic society….To take just one of many obvious examples: Insofar as constitutional law makes everyone 
secure in the retention of his or her existing property entitlements, various harms and deficiencies of life that are 
suffered by the relatively propertyless may become uncorrectible in either ordinary judicial forums or ordinary 
channels of politics and legislation.22  
 
He would accordingly oppose or challenge Rawls’ “reasonable pluralism of comprehensive 
views” with a “reasonable interpretative pluralism.” Where the former pivots on the belief that 
the core area or central ranges of human rights discourses allows for reasoned consensus 
between the most diverse worldviews, the latter would insist on the irreducible uncertainty 
from which even the core area of human rights normativity cannot escape. Reasonable 
interpretative pluralism, explained Michelman, concerns  
 
the fact of irresolvable uncertainty and, in real political time, irreparable reasonable disagreement among 
inhabitants of a modern country about the set of entrenchments and interpretations of human rights - the 
dispensations with regard to private property rights, for example - that would truly satisfy justice in the country’s 
historical circumstances.23 
 
To be sure, Michelman, did not simply assert this “fact of irresolvable uncertainty … and 
irreparable reasonable disagreement” in “real political time” regarding human rights claims in 
this response to Rawls (as he can be said to have done in the responses to Kennedy and 
Rosenfeld outlined above). Here he only supposed that it is true – “I want, therefore to suppose 
here that reasonable interpretive pluralism is quite broadly and strongly true”24 - for the sake 
of raising an argument regarding the democratic legitimation that ultimately underpins human 
rights regimes and the coercion that follows from them. Democratic procedures can surely not 
be invoked to legitimise human rights discourses if all questions issuing from such discourses 
could be resolved with recourse to reasoned argument (in other words, if their legitimacy is 
basically intrinsic to themselves). The whole idea of democratic legitimation of human rights 
discourses would be doomed were this to be the case, conceded Michelman. But supposing that 
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it is not the case, as he did here, does this mean that democratic procedures can adequately 
resolve all the political questions that human rights discourses cannot resolve? 
 
They cannot argued Michelman, at least not all of them, for democratic procedures themselves 
pivoted on foundational decisions that are not and cannot be the outcome of democratic 
procedures. The hole in the bottom of all legitimation procedures – the fact that they cannot 
account for themselves – also applies to democratic legitimation. All democratic-discursive 
processes are themselves “inescapably legally conditioned and constituted processes.” They 
are constituted, for example, by the laws regarding political representation and elections, civil 
associations, families, freedom of speech, property, and access to media, and so on.”25 These 
processes themselves will therefore also have to be constantly submitted to an “adequately 
democratic and influential discursive process of critical re-examination.” Legitimacy or 
respect-worthiness can therefore clearly be seen to be subject to an infinite regress of critical 
re-examinations.26 
 
Michelman would revisit these questions in 2008 in order to respond to a question regarding 
the possibility of a pure constitutional theory that would ultimately not need to introduce 
categories of political theory to account for the irreducible rests of material power relations that 
haunt all considerations of legitimacy. He gave the clear answer that such a theory is not 
possible. He again unpacked the question with reference to Habermas’ and Rawls’ attempts to 
establish normative discourses that could categorically (Habermas) or broadly (Rawls) resolve 
questions of legitimacy in isolation of considerations of material power, more or less raising 
the same arguments as those outlined above. And he again elaborated the democracy argument 
– this time with extensive reference to Jeremy Waldron’s proposal that democratic procedures 
meet the demands of a purely procedural justice. Waldron’s theory of majoritarian democracy 
seeks to construct a theory of pure procedural justice by having all questions of justice with 
regard to which we have differences of opinion decided by a majority decision that is not 
“biased up-front” with any substantive normative criteria and thus allows everyone an equal 
say in the matter. This is a very real attempt at “pure procedural justice”, conceded Michelman, 
but he nevertheless maintained that Waldron can ultimately not avoid questions regarding the 
aptness of the procedures that produce the majority outcomes that he takes as the only criterion 
for acceptable coercion. These questions regarding the aptness of these procedures range from 
more simple ones such as “who can vote, everyone or only people above a certain age?” to 
more complex ones such as “how much money can people be allowed to spend on influencing 
the majority decision?” Any attempt to answer them will not be able to avoid substantive 
considerations regarding the nature of proper democracy and thus of substantive political 
theory.27 The hole in the bottom of constitutional theory, the hole that exposes it to the wider 
environment of the study of material power, can thus not be closed. 
 
The veritable deconstruction of normative constitutional theory evident in these excerpts from 
Michelman’s work may well prompt one to ask why he would, at some point, insist so 
adamantly on the possibility of accommodating the demands of justice fully within the demand 
for justifying reasons in liberal political and legal reasoning.28 This question again seems 
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apposite in view of his later acceptance – for some years at least, before taking the new turn 
evident in his contribution to this volume – that SER may well be an element of liberal justice, 
but not of liberal law. I will nevertheless forego this question now for the sake of asking one 
that seems to demand more attention right now: Is it still possible for Michelman to endorse 
any kind of distinction between power politics and law? If his answer to this question would 
be positive, when then, according to Michelman, would power politics end and when would 
law begin?  
 
I believe Michelman’s answer to the first question is positive. He believes – in a qualified way, 
we shall see – that we can distinguish between law and politics, notwithstanding the 
deconstruction of this distinction in his work that we have traced above. That leads us straight 
to the second question: When does politics end and when does law begin, according to him? 
Here is his startling answer: The law does not begin. It is, at least in a certain way, there from 
the beginning – always there. Of course, everything turns here on the “certain way” in which 
law is, according to Michelman, always there. This is how he puts the matter: 
 
According to the view I hold, participants in American constitutional democracy cannot help but suppose – or 
imagine – that the American people, enacting or amending constitutional law, are engaged in an exercise not of 
sheer, arbitrary will but rather of judgment under a pre-existing idea of political morality and right.29 
 
The enactments of amendments of constitutions and constitutional law is of course the crucial 
context for understanding what is at stake here. All other legal reform and change can be 
dismissed as of no consequence for the timeless and continuous existence of law, as long as 
such reform and change can be anchored in constitutional law that has always been there. But, 
constitutional change and amendment confronts one with change that cannot be accommodated 
in the overarching and timeless continuity of a legal regime. Constitutional change would seem 
to confront us with a beginning, a beginning that destroys the eternity of law that Michelman 
would seem to be invoking here. But the enactment or amendment of constitutional law itself, 
claims Michelman, is not a new beginning. It too requires accommodation under a “pre-existing 
idea of political morality and right.” The question has been posed whether Michelman is 
surreptitiously slipping into a neo-natural law here,30 but this is not the case. Michelman is not 
saying that constitutional enactments and amendments can be accommodated under a “pre-
existing idea of political morality and right.” He only says that Americans must suppose or 
imagine such enactments and amendments to be accommodated thus. It is this “must suppose 
or imagine” that distinguishes his position from a natural law stance, as we shall see presently. 
 
The American people would appear to have a founding faith regarding this need to suppose or 
imagine the foundations of their constitution and their law. It can be traced all the way to the 
words of Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Hannah 
Arendt observes pointedly:  
 
Jefferson must have been dimly aware of [the fallacy of this position that ... mathematical ‘laws’ were of the same 
nature as the laws of a community, or that the former could somehow inspire the latter], for otherwise he would 
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not have indulged in the somewhat incongruous phrase, ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident’, but would have 
said: These truths are self-evident....31 
 
It is this Jeffersonian move that Michelman repeats when he proposes that Americans who 
participate in American constitutional democracy must consider their constitutional enactments 
and amendments to take place under the validation of a “pre-existing idea of political morality 
and right.” Sociologically or realistically speaking, law, pure law that can be distinguished from 
politics and relations of power, does not exist. It exists by virtue of a performative assumption 
or supposition that it exists. Everything turns on whether one wants to “participate in 
constitutional democracy” or not. Those who do must sign up for the project and stick to it; 
and, sticking to it, loyally and faithfully, is what ultimately sustains the project. It is, in fact, 
the only thing that sustains the project. There is something fundamentally autopoietic about the 
sustenance of constitutional democracy, Michelman would appear to suggest. We shall revisit 
this point again below by taking a brief look at a crucial passage from the work of the author 
who made the term “autopoiesis” salient in contemporary social science. Suffice it to observe 
here that this autopoietic sustenance of the law is also the pivot on which Kelsen’s pure theory 
of law turns. Kelsen is as aware as any decent sociologist of law that pure law does not exist. 
“Pure law” only remains a meaningful expression as long as we are willing to sustain the 
presupposition of pure law, that is, the presupposition of a secure foundational legal norm that 
validates all other legal norms.32 Schmitt was probably one of the first to ridicule what he took 
as “the blatant positivism” of Kelsen’s invocation of norms that have no foundation in the 
political will or existence of a people.33 But perhaps it was because Schmitt’s primary concern 
was with signing up for the existential project of a people, rather than signing up for 
constitutional democracy, that he simply could not see the signing up – indeed, the political 
endorsement – that underpins Kelsen’s theory of law. At issue here is not an absence of politics, 
but a different politics, one that takes the rule of law as its autopoietic principle.     
 
Michelman’s Hohfeldian constructivism 
 
Once one is prepared to assume that one is “always under law,” and thus that the law has no 
beginning, in the way Michelman suggests we have to assume this when we participate in 
constitutional democracy, we also have to assume that the law never ends. One can take this 
assumption as a simple expression of hope that the rule of law will never fall to ashes again as 
it has done all too often in the past, but taken as just this, it can obviously not have much 
significance for the way one understands the rule of law while it still prevails. The interminable 
future of law – its infinite posterity – just does not seem to have the same significance for its 
present application as its interminable past – its infinite pre-existence – has. So in what way is 
the assumption that the law never ends significant for the way we understand the present status 
and force of law? I believe Michelman’s work provides one with a very specific answer to this 
question. As long as we assume that we are always under law, we cannot assume that we are 
sometimes under law and sometimes not. And this means that we cannot assume that there are 
pockets of social existence that are governed by law while others are not. The argument 
regarding the endlessness of law thus becomes a “spatial” one. No area of social existence can 
be excluded from the ubiquitous reach of the law.  
 
The realisation that we are also spatially speaking “always under law” has very real 
significance for the way we understand the difference or lack of difference between positive 
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enactments of law and absence of such enactments. When we begin to assume that we are 
always under law, we cannot simultaneously entertain the idea that we are not under law when 
it would appear that the law-maker has issued no positive or concrete legal rules for governing 
a specific situation. One must then also take any apparent absence of law as an expression of 
law, and this absence of law must accordingly also comply with the fundamental norms 
embodied in higher or foundational legal norms. In other words, failures of a law-maker to 
make law can and must accordingly also be assessed with reference to the duties that 
foundational norms impose on law-makers. 
 
This point is of course crucially significant for questions pertaining to the legal status of private 
spheres that constantly arise with the so-called horizontal effect doctrine that has occupied 20th 
century jurisprudence so pervasively. It is not necessary to revisit this doctrine here, apart from 
noting that Michelman has surely taken a pertinent stance in these debates by insisting on what 
he calls the “simple Hohfeldian point.”34 The simple Hohfeldian point concerns the recognition 
that all law – private law included – is the product of sovereign law-making. All such sovereign 
law-making must of course comply with the constitutional demands to which the sovereign has 
bound and continues to bind himself through performatively sustaining the assumption that he 
is “always under law,” as sovereigns do when they consider themselves constitutional 
sovereigns. There can therefore be no doubt, according to Michelman, that private law rules, 
or their absence, are subject to constitutional scrutiny. Much of his writing on this point is 
focussed on the puzzling refusal of some United States judges to recognise this “simple 
Hohfeldian point.”35 
 
The significance of this point for the question of the decline of the political constitution that 
Michelman raises in his LBC X SER argument is twofold. The first point of significance is this 
one: The recognition of the “simple Hohfeldian point” and the endorsement of the horizontal 
effect of fundamental rights that this recognition implies, evidently casts the human rights or 
fundamental rights concern at work in his thinking into a “positive duties of state” frame of 
thinking that distinguishes his liberalism in very certain terms from the typical libertarianism 
– these days more often known as neo-liberalism – in terms of which rights are nothing but 
normative guarantees for private liberties with which the state may not interfere. Michelman’s 
liberalism is thus a political liberalism that evidently calls for sovereign government action as 
a condition for liberty, and not for the suppression of government action as something that is 
irreconcilable with personal liberty. His liberal constitutionalism can surely also in this respect 
be regarded as a political constitutionalism. Not only does it involve a foundational political 
endorsement – Jeffersonian or Kelsenian, as we saw above – in favour of a rights-based 
framework of government. It also involves a conception of this framework of government as 
an ongoing programme of positive political realisation of fundamental rights. Positive or active 
government is written all over this scheme. A serious concern with SER would not have been 
consistent with Michelman’s thinking, had this not been the case. It is the Hohfeldian argument 
for the sovereign responsibility of the state to act that makes Michelman a left-leaning liberal 
or a socio-liberal, as I argue elsewhere. Europeans would do well not to read into Michelman’s 
“liberalism” a libertarianism which it is definitely not. In European terminology, he is by all 
fair accounts a social-democratic constitutional theorist. And of course, as is the case with all 
social-democrats – who know they have to put up with the whole spectrum of neo-liberals, 
libertarians and ordo-liberals and work out some common existence with them (like the poor 
they will always be with us) – it is exactly their democratic credentials that separate them from 
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a more radical leftism. Radical leftism may well make their hearts beat faster, but social 
democrats know, perhaps sadly, that a truly radical leftism had better be considered a poetic 
concern or a concern with poetry.36    
 
The second point of significance that Michelman’s basic Hohfeldian position holds for political 
constitutionalism concerns the way it addresses a crucial question that emerged from his SER 
travels outlined above. As we saw, Michelman found it bothersome – or took seriously the 
possibility that some may find it bothersome – that constitutional documents could embody 
SER without demanding their justiciability. Non-justiciability of rights that are conspicuously 
embodied in a constitution, raises the spectre of judicial abdication, or may plausibly be 
considered to do so. Rights should either be embodied and justiciable, or not embodied at all, 
would be the position of those who believe embodied-but-non-justiciable rights indeed raise 
this spectre or even more than this spectre (that is, the living reality of judicial abdication). 
Michelman nevertheless responded to this bother, we saw above, by developing the argument 
that some rights can be embodied in constitutions as principles of political aspiration to which 
governments can be held accountable politically, without these aspirations ever becoming 
justiciable. Again, in his essay in this volume, he takes a closer look at the proposal of some 
constitutional scholars that SER must and can be deemed justiciable after all. But the important 
Hohfeldian insight that is worth bearing in mind in this regard is this one: From a Hohfeldian 
perspective, it would surely be no disaster for the LBC argument if some rights would turn out 
to be non-justiciable and would ultimately remain nothing more than principles or beacons of 
the political aspiration for which a Constitution may stand, as they quite often are. A right that 
ultimately remains nothing more than a political aspiration need not be regarded as a political 
or juridical embarrassment. 
 
A point that Martin Loughlin makes in his response to Michelman in this volume may well be 
touching the Achilles of non-justiciable SER that Michelman was sensing here, but ultimately 
dismissed as non-threatening. In the course of making his case for a political constitution that 
is based on a framework of historical governmental practices (practices of Herrschaft) and not 
of norms, Loughlin raises a different Hohfeldian point. Rights, he points out, do not exist prior 
to a judicial decision.37 Moreover (to elaborate somewhat in a way that Loughlin does not do 
expressly), recognition or identification of a right is one possible outcome of a judicial decision, 
not the only possible outcome. A court may well find that a particular legal relationship does 
not turn on the correlatives of rights and duties, but on those of non-rights and liberties. In other 
words, not only do rights not exist prior to judicial assessments of legal relationships, it may 
turn out that they do not exist at all. The facts of a case would first need to convince the court 
that a right is indeed at stake in the case before the court could grant a right. And only then 
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does a right come into existence. Rights can thus not be considered as independent or free-
standing normative entities that can guide or justify governmental action in advance. 
 
This is a powerful insight that underlines the need to recognise the peculiar status of rights that 
are merely listed as constitutional rights in constitutional documents. They are evidently not 
rights in the strictly legal sense of the word. They are indeed little more than aspirational 
concepts, the interpretation of which may or may not contribute to the recognition of a legal 
right in some specific case of legal conflict. From this perspective, one surely need not be 
overly sensitive about non-justiciable SER. All one needs to release the tension that may seem 
bothersome here is to pay proper attention to the Hohfeldian regard for the non-juridical status 
of all “rights” embodied in constitutional documents, prior to processes and practices of 
adjudication. This would allow one to accept that the coherence or consistency of rights 
discourses, especially SER discourses, does not depend on the possibility of judicial sanction. 
And this is why the understanding of SER as nothing more than aspirational or facilitative 
constitutional language that Michelman developed in recent work, is evidently in line with the 
Hohfeldian sentiments that inform his work. My reason for stressing this point will become 
clear towards the end of this essay. For now I first wish to tighten the screws of the 
deconstruction of the binary opposition between political and legal constitutions that I have, I 
believe, already developed quite far in my reading of Michelman’s work above. I will do so by 
turning the tables on Loughlin somewhat. I will ask the question whether the political 
constitution that Loughlin advocates can really be imagined effectively and forcefully today 
without relying very substantially on fundamental rights discourses. And I will prepare the 
ground for this question with recourse to an argument of Niklas Luhmann and to the elaboration 
of this argument in recent work of Chris Thornhill. 
 
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL IMAGINATION OF THE 
MODERN STATE 
 
When the batteries of pre-modern metaphysics finally expired, modern politics found itself in 
need of new and more sustainable sources of governmental power. The luxurious reliance on 
external or transcendent sources of power that characterised pre-modern politics thus came to 
give way to a search for immanent sources of power.  Fundamental rights were one of the key 
outcomes of this search. The result was a remarkable technological invention through which 
power could be generated from immanent sources, now that transcendence had finally fizzled 
out and fused. The invention turned on a division of modern societies into a source and an 
object of legitimation. This internal division of itself into a source of legitimation, called civil 
society, and an object of legitimation, called the state, was the way in which modern society 
became its own source of power. A passage from Grundrechte als Institution, an early text of 
Luhmann, provides one with a striking explanation of that which came to pass here: 
 
The necessity to provide foundations – of which the profound rootedness in the division between thought and 
existence cannot be discussed here – splits social reality with cleaving force into a sphere of the state and a sphere 
of society. The state has to justify itself to and in society. (Hegel’s conception, which takes over this principle of 
division but inverses the foundational relation, never received a real following).38 
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In the wake of this division, the fundamental rights of citizens would effectively become the 
batteries from which the state would draw its power. Grundrechte als Institution seeks to dispel 
the idea that civil rights weakened or curbed the power of the state that often attaches to more 
facile understanding of civil rights. Civil rights became the source of legitimate state action. 
They constituted the self-evident parameters between which states could act and act forcefully. 
Sovereigns could appeal to civil rights – and claim to be acting in honour and pursuit of them 
– in the same way that they used to be able to appeal to God. Chris Thornhill elaborates this 
pivotal move in Grundrechte als Institution further in a powerful socio-historical narrative of 
the development of modern constitutionalism.39  
 
Thornhill’s narrative shows how centralised state bureaucracies emerged in the wake of or 
concomitant to judicial centralisation towards the end of the Middle Ages. The emergence of 
centralised bureaucratic government that precipitated and conditioned the rise of modern states 
followed in the wake of increasing reliance on the judicial powers of royal courts for relief 
from the perceived arbitrariness of the justice administered by seigniorial courts. The 
increasing role that royal courts commenced to play almost throughout Europe towards the 
fourteenth and fifteen centuries marked the end of the seigniorial rule that defined feudalism. 
Maintenance of ever-larger royal judiciaries provided legitimation for centralised taxation, 
centralised policing and centralised execution of justice.40 This development was the crucial 
dynamic in the process to which Thornhill refers as “political abstraction,” the abstraction of 
political power from the personal and particular relations in which medieval power was 
embedded. 
 
This expansion of royal power invariably went hand in hand with power struggles between 
monarchs and princes and generally only came about concomitant to concessionary 
compromises in terms of which the monarchs accepted legal restrictions and limitations of their 
now extended sovereignty. A telling case in point was the way the institution of the 
Reichskammergericht in the Holy Roman Empire in 1495 was not only an outcome of 
expanded monarchical or centralised power, but also an outcome of the demands of the German 
princes in terms of which they believed they could also wrest power away from the Emperor 
by means of an independent judiciary.41 In keeping with this latter aspect of the historical shift 
that was taking place here, was the increasing prominence of the conception of natural or 
natural law limitations on the monarch’s power that were embodied in the common law. The 
important point that Thornhill makes here, however, is the fact that this counter side to the 
expansion of royal power did not give personal power back to the princes. Common law 
restrictions on the monarch’s sovereignty did not re-personalise power and thus did not limit 
sovereignty in a contingent historical manner. In this respect it did not, in fact, take power away 
from the monarch again. To the contrary, it contributed to the consolidation of royal power by 
extending the process of the depersonalisation of power that was taking place so as to also 
bring about the depersonalisation of the monarch’s power and the emergence of law as public 
law.42 
 
In this process, argues Thornhill with reference to a thesis of J. Russell Major, the two sides of 
this political abstraction development intensified one another in a remarkable way. Contrary 
to the conventional wisdom that natural law or common law restrictions weakened the 
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monarch’s power, it provided the exercise of royal power with definitional normative 
boundaries within the parameters of which royal power could be exercised with greater and not 
lesser legitimacy.43 Thus did the ever-larger administration of royal justice precipitate both the 
centralisation of the Modern Age and the principle of universal (as opposed to particular) rights 
on which the legitimacy of the Modern Age came to turn. Closely connected to his instructive 
narrative of modern constitutionalism is Thornhill’s assertion that it is towards strong states 
that one must look for adequate protection of constitutional rights. Twentieth century 
totalitarianism and fascism have inspired the libertarian identification of strong states as the 
major threat to constitutional rights. Thornhill argues persuasively that fascism and national 
socialism should much rather be understood in terms of the fatal weakening of centralised state 
structures towards the beginning of the twentieth century and the increasing dependence of 
states on allegiances with highly powerful private legal subjects.44 
 
We have followed Thornhill’s Luhmannian narrative far enough to scrutinise further the 
distinction between the political and the legal constitution and the contemporary demise of the 
former and ascendancy of the latter that Michelman invokes towards the end of his essay in 
this issue. Both Michelman and Loughlin sustain this distinction between the political and the 
legal constitution. Michelman, however, would surely not want to sustain this distinction as a 
pure or stable one, considering his own deconstruction of pure legality that we have traced 
above, that is, his own excavation of coercive political practices that ultimately sustain all 
normative or rights discourses. For him, we saw, the distinction between law and politics 
ultimately only retains its sense on the shoulders of a performative supposition that it is 
important to keep on drawing this distinction. 
 
How do things stand with Loughlin on this count? Can he, in view of the insights that one 
draws from Luhmann and Thornhill, really consider the normativity of rights discourses 
significantly foreign to the historical art of government embodied in the political constitution? 
Are fundamental rights not par excellence historical inventions that allowed for new forms of 
power and new technologies of government?45 My sense is that Loughlin too can only sustain 
the distinction between the political and the legal constitution on the shoulders of a 
performative supposition that this distinction is possible and important. Perhaps his ultimate 
point is very similar to the one Michelman makes with regard to American constitutional 
democrats. British constitutional democrats can only remain British constitutional democrats 
as long as they sustain the aesthetic sense that their constitution is the product of the art of 
government and the sediment of centuries of good political practice, and not the reflection of 
abstract legal or human rights norms, notwithstanding the fact that few of them would want to 
see their fine art and practices of government take leave of these legal norms today. 
 
What I hope to have shown in this and in the previous section with regard to Michelman’s 
profile as a left-leaning liberal constitutional theorist (Section III) and with regard to the 
institutional imagination of the modern state (Section IV), is the irreparable porosity of the 
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distinction between the legal and political constitutions with which Michelman and Loughlin 
take issue in their respective contributions to this volume. It is hardly possible to give 
categorical priority to either of them in the context of modern and postmodern constitutional 
democracies. In the modern state, the prioritisation of either the legal or the political 
constitution would have to make so many concessions to the other that they would end up 
coming across as the same thing that is being looked at from different angles for purposes of 
stressing a range of aesthetic or cultural differences. This is surely only the beginning of a 
discussion and not its end, but I wish to leave things here for now in order to first consider how 
continental Europeans may want to respond to an LBC x SER argument today. The significance 
and aim of the deconstruction between the political and legal constitution that I have offered 
here should become clearer towards the end of the discussion of SER in Europe that follows 
now. 
 
V. THE FATE OF LBC X SER IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Let us pick up the discussion again with Luhmann’s passage regarding the self-foundation of 
modern societies quoted above. Crucial elements of the historical context that determine the 
fate of SER in the EU today can be illuminated well with reference to the split between the 
state and civil society with which Luhmann takes issue in this passage. However, the intriguing 
aspect of Luhmann’s articulation of the crucial dynamics of modern legitimation does not only 
consist in the ingenious way in which he portrays civil rights as the sustainable source of 
modern power that literally liberates power from relying on non-sustainable or already-
exhausted external or transcendent sources. It also consists in the way Luhmann acknowledges 
that Hegel already articulated this scheme of division (Trennschema) but in an inverse fashion. 
Luhmann does not elaborate the point further, but it is important to understand well what he is 
alluding to. For Hegel, the dynamics of modern legitimation also consisted in the relation 
between state and civil society, but for him, the state was the source of legitimation and civil 
society the object of legitimation. At issue here is the thesis that Joachim Ritter articulated 
brilliantly in his essay on Hegel and the French Revolution.46 Hegel regarded the modern state 
as the embodiment and guardian of the ideal of moral autonomy that inspired the French 
Revolution. For Hegel the state remained responsible for preventing the reduction of moral 
autonomy to economic liberty in modern societies, and he masterfully portrayed the potential 
of civil society to reduce moral autonomy to economy liberty and to ultimately destroy moral 
autonomy completely. For him it was the duty of the state, as guarantor of Kantian morality, to 
prevent this from happening.47 
 
Hegel was not followed, observes Luhmann in passing, and here too he is undoubtedly right. 
The development of nineteenth century liberal constitutionalism in Germany (but also in the 
United States) would ultimately end with the triumph of economic liberties over a broader 
Kantian understanding of moral liberty.48 From this triumph of economic liberty over Kantian 
moral autonomy at the end of the nineteenth century it was but a short step to the twentieth 
century reduction of constitutional liberty to economic liberty in the conservative ordo-liberal 
economic thinking of a group of theorists that became known as the Freiburg School. The ordo-
liberal turn in constitutional thinking indeed took economic liberty as the deontological or 
moral base of modern societies and turned it into its sole constitutional principle (thus turning 
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constitutional law into competition law). And it is this ordo-liberalism that became the main 
framework of thinking embodied in the European Treaties and ultimately came to inform what 
many observers consider a privileging of economic liberties in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).49 
 
The reduction of a broader framework of moral autonomy guarantees to a narrower set of 
economic liberties is pointedly captured by Dieter Grimm in the following assessment of the 
tensions that are current today between the ECJ and the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(GFCC): 
 
[D]ivergences between EU and national fundamental rights norms increase by the day as integration marches 
ahead. The tendency of the ECJ is to review national law strictly, while treating EU law generously. Economic 
freedoms tend to enjoy more weight in the ECJ’s jurisprudence than personal and communication rights. The 
opposite is the case in the jurisprudence of the GFCC. Whether this will change now that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU has come into force, and with the impending accession of the EU to the European 
Convention of Human Rights, remains to be seen. In the meantime, however, this will remain a field in which the 
GFCC has to guard over national concerns.50 
 
Many analysts of judicial developments in the EU would certainly not hesitate to identify the 
Laval and Viking series of judgements of the Court in 2007 and 2008 as the apex of the ECJ’s 
reduction of a broader fundamental rights framework to a framework of economic liberties that 
Grimm brings to the fore here.51 In the eyes of many, the ECJ earned for itself the reputation 
of a Lochner court with these judgements.52 One need not suggest that the Court has branded 
itself for perpetuity with a series of judgments passed within a very short span of time in 2007 
and 2008, but the parallel to West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish53 – the USSC judgment that 
signalled the end of the Lochner era in the United States after more than 30 years – has surely 
not passed through Luxembourg yet. For all practical purposes, EU citizens must therefore still 
consider themselves stuck in the Laval and Viking era of the ECJ, that is, the era of Lochner in 
Luxembourg. And it is with this context in mind – and in the hope that Europeans will not have 
to wait till the 2030s before West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish comes to Luxembourg – that one 
should consider the implications of Michelman’s LBC x SER argument for the European 
Union. 
 
To be sure, Michelman himself gives us a clue to the kind of thinking that might ensue here. 
He acknowledges that constitutionalised SER may well come to backfire in climates of neo-
liberalisation.54 It is worthwhile quoting him in full for purposes of setting the scene well for 
the response that is due here:  
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53 300 U.S 379 (1937). 
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It is also possible, of course, with regard to any class of rights or claims you might think of, that by 
constitutionalizing it you take the risk that the institutions of the second proceduralization will read the right 
adversely to the very sort of institutional outcomes you hoped it would promote. (And maybe constitutionalized 
SER, in today’s neoliberalizing climates, stand at especial risk of that kind of backfire.55 
 
The recognition of the right to strike as a fundamental right in Laval and Viking surely 
backfired, some will say.56 The ECJ’s recognition of this right more or less killed it, will be the 
deep sentiment of many in this regard. Those who indeed believe this to be the case will surely 
have reason to ask whether the constitutionalisation of SER is desirable when such 
constitutionalisation can so easily backfire so badly. And of course, as Michelman points out 
well, this backfiring can take place as easily with the constitutionalisation of any other right, 
not only of SER. So that leads us to serious questions regarding constitutionalisation as such. 
Should one not rather forgo LBC, not only when conjoined with SER, but LBC as such, 
always? Loughlin may well think the LBC batsman looks rattled here and that the political 
constitution bowler57 – a chap from the sceptred isle? – looks close to claiming a wicket. Well, 
if LBC batting can only be done in the way the ECJ batsmen have been doing it in Laval and 
Viking, many social democrats will indeed hope that someone will come to bowl them out soon. 
The Germans are surely not known for their bowling, but they have been shaving ECJ stumps 
a couple of times lately and may just get their line and length right one of these days. And who 
knows, they may then come to realise that they themselves started the kind of LBC batting that 
is resented here, and also begin to refrain from it. We shall see below that it is indeed in 
Germany where the trouble started.  
 
There is another kind of LBC batting, however, and it is doubtful whether the Brits, the 
Germans, the Americans or anyone else from the celebrated grounds of constitutional 
democracy, would really want these other batsmen to lose their wickets. At issue is a kind of 
LBC batting that all constitutional democrats can always accept as cricket. To rephrase: there 
is a kind of LBC practice that may well satisfy both the legal constitution and the political 
constitution teams, so much so that the difference between them becomes negligible in this 
respect. And it is in this regard that I wish to respond briefly, in conclusion, to Mark Tushnet’s 
question in this volume regarding the institutional imagination that may make LBC, LBC x 
SER included, acceptable and workable; not only to both political and legal constitutionalists, 
but also to all constitutional democrats at all times; not just to social democrats at some times 
and then to libertarian democrats (assuming for the moment this is not a complete oxymoron) 
at other times. 
 
The discussion of the fate of SER in the EU above confronts one with the reality of an ordo- or 
neo-liberal politics that hides itself behind pretensions of legal interpretation. Considered from 
this background, the need to understand well what is at stake in Michelman’s and Loughlin’s 
respective explorations of and associations with legal and political constitutions should be very 
clear. As we saw above, legal and political constitutionalists would appear to look at the same 
thing from different angles. But I would like to believe that neither of them has an interest in 
the obfuscation of the difference between law and politics for purposes of surreptitious 
promotions of political programmes. I would like to think that both of them have a very real 
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interest in a retaining a sound distinction between law and politics – by way of a Kelsenian 
presupposition or in whatever other way they may prefer – notwithstanding their awareness of 
the ultimate instability of this distinction. I would like to think that both legal and political 
constitutionalists would ultimately wish to see politics practised as politics under the auspices 
of political institutions, and not in legal institutions under cover of law. I would like to believe 
both would like to understand law – again, as far as this is feasible – as an occasional and 
preferably rather exceptional external check on politics, and not just another regular form of 
politics. I think one can say this of both Michelman and Loughlin, and surely also of Tushnet, 
whose call for a more concrete imagining of LBC x SER will now receive attention. I fear I 
will not be offering Tushnet anything new, but something that has been around for a while 
before it started fading from memory in the second half of the 20th century. Moreover, that 
which I have to offer, he would probably find, does not differ much from the weak form judicial 
review that he himself considers appropriate for the review of both SER guarantees and 
classical constitutional liberties.    
 
VI. CLASSICAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM 
 
Let us return to Michelman’s description of the experimental way in which the justiciability of 
SER can come to work. He describes it, we saw above, as an initially tentative process of 
benchmarking in the course of which judiciaries can eventually come to tighten the screws on 
governments with reference to standards of compliance that have emerged clearly enough to 
warrant such tightening of screws. This description envisages a kind of dialogue between courts 
and governments, but does not pay specific attention to the institutional settings and structures 
along the rails of which this dialogue might proceed; hence Tushnet’s fair call for a more 
specific institutional vision of this process, in his response to Michelman in this volume.58 I 
will draw my response to Michelman to a close now, by also offering some response to 
Tushnet’s call, and, to repeat somewhat, I trust Tushnet will sense that my response resonates 
in many respects not only with the thoughts that he offers in this volume, but also with thoughts 
that he has articulated elsewhere.59 
 
Let us return to Lochner. The dismay which Lochner caused in American jurisprudence does 
not only concern the fact that the majority opinion of Justice Peckham sought to impose Herbert 
Spencer economic thinking on the people of the state of New York, as Justice Holmes’ dissent 
pointed out.60 It also concerns the manner of judicial review that allowed for this imposition. 
This manner of judicial review turned on substantive readings of the United States Constitution 
that attributed to constitutional clauses a very specific meaning that was far from self-evident. 
It came to be known as substantive due process. The substantive due process review in Lochner 
happened to entail an endorsement of laissez-faire economics, but the method of review could 
also have come up, at another time, with a very different substantive reading of the Constitution 
– entailing, perhaps, a very robust defence of some or other communitarian regulation of 
society for purposes of striking down liberalising legislation. The problem with substantive due 
process judicial review should therefore not be located in specific outcomes of judicial 
decisions that may “backfire on one’s expectations,” as Michelman puts it, for the extent to 
which substantive due process review will backfire on some expectations could surely be 
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counted as annulled by the extent to which it will surely conform with others. The problem that 
pertains to substantive due process concerns the more fundamental question whether judiciaries 
should command the prerogative to backfire on or meet with expectations by passing judgment 
on matters that constitutional democrats may want to consider the exclusive prerogative of 
democratically elected governments. 
 
The problem, in other words, is the juristocratic usurpation of sovereignty that Michelman 
himself emphasises as one of the two legs (usurpation and abdication) of the “standard worry” 
that kicks in when the justiciability of SER is at stake. It is this usurpation of democratic 
sovereignty – more than everything else, more than the incidental promotion of market 
liberalism – that should be bothering one when the Laval and Viking judgments of the ECJ 
move one to talk about the era of Lochner in Luxembourg. The story of how the ECJ came to 
this substantive due process Lochnerisation of European judicial review need not be told fully 
here, but will be touched upon in a moment. However, the question that we first need to ask in 
response to Michelman’s exploration of the LBC x SER arguments that constitutional scholars 
have been proposing lately, is this: Would constitutional democrats not want to make sure that 
the experimental benchmarking and eventual tightening of the screws that these scholars 
propose as a circumspect way into proper justicialisation of SER – and thus as the way towards 
securing the fourth domino of LBC x SER – exclude and banish from this process every hint 
of substantive due process review? Michelman himself would seem to suggest this is not 
possible. Constitutionalisation of SER may still come to backfire on one’s expectations in 
“today’s neoliberalizing climates,” he says, notwithstanding the circumspect entry into the 
project of LBC that this experimental benchmarking proposes as a possible way forward. The 
tentative and experimental benchmarking and eventual tightening of the screws on government 
that Michelman has outlined so carefully, do not seem to exclude the possibility of very 
substantive “neo-liberal” back-firings, suggests his footnote 79. If so, a constitutional democrat 
would surely want to stay clear of this whole process. He or she will still detect too much scope 
for Lochnerisation here, albeit a kind of slowed-down (and therefore more effectively 
surreptitious?) Lochnerisation.    
 
The question remains whether the entry into LBC x SER that Michelman describes can be 
imagined in a way that would render his footnote 79 redundant. I would like to suggest it can, 
and pretty much without reinventing the wheel at that. The easiest way of unpacking my 
suggestion is to briefly retrace the development in European judicial review that eventually got 
the ECJ locked into Lochnerisation in Laval and Viking. The story starts with the GFCC’s 
celebrated Lüth decision in 1957.61 This decision introduced a new kind of judicial review 
procedure into German constitutional jurisprudence that was very similar to the kind of 
balancing of interests that one would typically find in private law adjudication. The Lüth court 
referred to the schonendste Ausgleich or balancing of competing values in this regard. This 
new kind of review – judicial balancing – drew much criticism from German constitutional 
scholars over the years. One of the points of critique that would be levelled at it concerned its 
inevitable lack of transparency, considering that it invariably concerned the balancing of 
incongruous concerns that afforded one no clear basis for meaningful comparison. 
 
The bottom line was that competing values such as equality and liberty or personal dignity and 
freedom of expression do not provide one with a basis of comparison. Balancing in any strict 
sense of the word is simply not possible when such tensions are at issue. What really happens 
in such processes of so-called balancing, remains enveloped in darkness as Matthias Rüffert 
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puts it well – [w]ie es zur Rückumwandlung der objektivrechtlichen Ausstrahlungswirkung in 
ein subjektives, verfassungsbeschwerdefähiges Grundrecht kommt … bleibt im Dunkeln.62  
And it is under cover of this darkness that judicial usurpations of sovereignty take place. Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde described the shift from democratic to judicial law-making that this 
kind of balancing makes possible with much lucidity in his critique of the jurisprudence in 
Lüth.63 
 
A very real line leads from Lüth to Laval, for Lüth made a huge career in Europe, both in the 
national jurisdictions and in the supra-national jurisdictions of the ECJ and the ECHR. And it 
does not take much imagination to understand that the line from Lüth to Laval can be traced – 
somewhat constructively, granted – to Lochner. Lüth effectively introduced Lochnerian 
substantive due process into European judicial review and it is this substantive due process that 
underpinned the balancing of the right to strike (Article 28 of the Charter of Rights) with the 
freedom of resettlement and reflagging (Articles 43 and 49 TEC, now Articles 49 and 56 
TFEU) in Laval and Viking. If this kind of substantive due process is to be avoided in future, 
European judges would have to return to the classical proportionality test with which Europe’s 
national constitutional courts generally used to review the legislation of their parliaments. And 
it is this return to classical conceptions of proportionality review that I also wish to offer as a 
way out of Michelman’s footnote 79. This is also the response that I would like to offer to 
Tushnet’s call for a more concrete institutional framework that might make LBC x SER 
arguments work (for everyone at all times). Nothing new need be invented, but an imaginative 
memory of how things used to work before the malaise of judicial balancing infected 20th 
century constitutional review procedures is badly needed here. 
 
In what way does the classical proportionality test offer us an escape from substantive due 
process and a restoration of democratic sovereignty, without forfeiting the whole LBC project? 
The three legs on which the test stands evidently envisage the greatest possible leeway for 
democratically elected governments to exercise their democratic right to govern. It subjects 
this right to elementary checks that these democratically elected governments can imagine as 
welcome support for any attempt to govern well, and not as some kind of limitation on the right 
to govern. This is surely how one can understand the appropriateness (broad reconcilability 
with liberal democratic principles), rationality (means-ends correlations) and necessity (least 
intrusiveness) requirements of the test, as I explain more extensively elsewhere.64 Perhaps the 
most important element of the test is the fact that it cannot be applied in the absence of 
democratic legislation (or constructive legislation). It does therefore not allow for the abstract 
and obscure “balancing” of values that cannot be balanced, for the scope of their scrutiny is 
limited to examining the way parliamentary majorities have decided – through a simple 
procedure of voting that testifies to its own groundlessness65 – exactly that which cannot be 
balanced. Had the Laval and Viking court considered itself bound to parliamentary legislation 
in this way, the outcome of these cases would have been drastically different, for they would 
have had to consider themselves bound to Member State law and legislation that allowed the 
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strikes in these cases, considering that the European Parliament had not yet passed legislation 
amended or abrogated applicable Member State law or legislation.66 
 
The classical proportionality test explained above allows one to imagine justiciability of SER 
on the basis of a sound progression of “tentative benchmarking” and eventual “tightening of 
screws on government” in a way that renders Michelman’s footnote 79 redundant. It allows for 
the experimental judicial review with which the fourth domino of LBC x SER might be 
secured, but not for one in which judiciaries perform some of the most critical steps in the 
experiment on their own. It requires that judges largely restrict their part in the process to 
double checking the results of experiments performed in Parliament. Perhaps one should 
change Michelman’s description of the experiment somewhat. Judiciaries should never tighten 
the screws “on government.” They should simply check whether the screws of government are 
well tightened. And if they find that they are not, they should send the product back for the 
screws to be tightened again, and again if necessary. They should never be tempted by the idea 
that they have the tools for doing the tightening themselves. 
 
Michelman may already have sensed what is at stake here in 1979 when he endeavoured to 
base constitutional protection of the poor on Ely’s “representation-reinforcing” arguments. In 
the end, however, he questioned the feasibility of the project because of a “Hohfeldian” concern 
that courts can hardly forge remedies of this kind in the absence of legislation. This is how he 
phrased his caution:  
   
[T]he duty [to ensure a social minimum nevertheless] seems to be one that courts acting alone cannot or ought not 
undertake to define, impose and enforce. Indeed, the texts themselves would hardly tolerate judicial enforcement 
in the face of legislative passivity.67 
 
Activation of the Fourteenth Amendment requires more than “the purely quiescent state,” he 
added, “it requires positive “making or enforcement of laws.”  But we have seen above that 
this is not the way Michelman generally interpreted Hohfeld over the years. Indeed, he already 
recognises the “moribund” status of that “letter” (this interpretation of Hohfeld) in 1969.68 
What really bothered Michelman here was much rather the Rawlsian concern – the concern 
that Rawls articulated at the time but dismissed later – that judiciaries should generally not fare 
onto the unfathomable oceans of government on their own. They should wait for government 
to invite them on board the ship of governance for purposes of essential safety checks. That is 
how they take part in the journey of sovereignty. 
 
Seeing matters in this way may require that we perhaps reconsider the phrase “Legitimation by 
Constitution” in the context of judicial review. Perhaps LBC should be exchanged for DLBC 
– Delegitimation by Constitution – when justiciability of SER or any other “right,” for that 
matter, is at stake. Karl Popper famously proposed that scientific theories cannot be verified; 
they can only be falsified. This is of course not strictly true – one cannot be absolutely sure of 
falsification if one cannot even come close to being sure of verification. But let us forsake strict 
scrutiny for a moment for the sake of thinking a similar Popperian thought for judicial review. 
Judges cannot really tell what it is that Constitutions require or legitimise. The scope of the 
assessment that would have been required for doing so would always have exceeded all 
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available measures of assessment. But, we do believe that judiciaries – or some other forum 
that is relatively independent from government, as some political constitutionalists may want 
to stress – can tell governments that some or other particular act of government does not seem 
to make the grade. 
 
In the final analysis, Michelman’s description of the experimental and weak form of 
constitutional review does not seem to be at odds with the return to classical constitutional 
review in Europe – which would more or less amount to a return to rational basis review in 
terms of American constitutional review – that is proposed here. Do the last lines of his 
description not state, after all, that the judges in this process would not have “a door-closing 
last word” in the process? More questions regarding these last lines of the description are 
pertinent here. Let us add a set of italics to highlight something that may escape attention 
otherwise and then look at them again: 
 
At later stages, the court starts calling for substantive compliance with an emergent best-practice consensus, in 
the name of the constitutional right (say) to access to health care services. The screws tighten on what can count 
as a reasonable, sincere governmental response. The court serves as arbiter but it never has or claims a door-
closing last word. 
 
Does Michelman not in fact make it quite clear here that it is not the right as such that is 
justiciable (in the form of an abstract judicial predication that the content of the right demands, 
say, governmental practice x, y, or z), but indeed only some practice of government that is 
justiciable? Does he not further make abundantly clear that it is not compliance of this 
governmental practice with a right that is at stake in this justiciability, but compliance of this 
practice with an emergent best-practice consensus in the name of [a] constitutional right? The 
answers to both these questions can surely only be positive. The message should therefore be 
clear that the judicial scrutiny that is envisaged here concerns the judicial evaluation of a 
current governmental practice in view of better practices that have already emerged earlier. In 
other words, it proposes a form of LBC x SER that allows or commands judges to call upon 
government not to fall foul of benchmarks or good practices that it had itself set earlier, and it 
allows and commands these judges to do so without bringing the contents or the “true meaning” 
of the right directly into the framework of deliberation. All of this would suggest that the right 
in the name of which this deliberation is performed, remains – as a discursive orientation point 
– essentially outside the framework of deliberation.69 It is nothing more than an institutional, 
semantic, symbolic or rhetorical category – a topic, Aristotle may have wanted to call it70 – 
with reference to which a discussion or deliberation can be launched. Well, if this is indeed a 
cogent reading of this passage, one might well begin to wonder whether the LBC x SER 
practice that Michelman is describing here adds anything to the non-justiciability of SER which 
he has been stressing in recent years. It would appear that the justiciability of SER that this 
LBC x SER practice aims to secure concerns some sort of pseudo-justiciability, and one may 
even want to go so far as to say that it simply commences to call something justiciable that is 
nothing of the sort. 
 
It is important to note, however, that the effective removal of SER from the justiciability that 
this strict reading of the LBC x SER practice – as described here by Michelman – renders 
                                                     
69 A certain Lefortian or Böckenfördian thought comes into view here. Cf. Van der Walt “The Ombre Spirituel of 
Statehood in the European Union.”   
70 See ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS. TOPICA (1960). The point of this suggestion is to show again that the 
whole practice of judicial review can easily be presented as a rhetorical institution which Loughlin’s political 
constitutionalism can easily accommodate without betraying its historicist and anti-metaphysical sensibilities. On 
this point, see again Van der Walt “The Ombre Spirituel of Statehood in the European Union” fn. 12. 
possible, does not yet rid the practice of all the substantive due process elements of which one 
might want to rid it. There is still a significant substantive due process catch possible in this 
LBC practice that may prompt one to tighten the De-legitimation screws – which we have 
already begun to tighten with this strict reading of the practice – somewhat more (especially in 
view of the EU context in which this question is posed here). Why should a judiciary have the 
institutional capacity to demand governmental compliance with best or better practices of a 
previous government? Would that not allow the judiciary to effectively annul a massive 
electoral victory by, say, a neo-liberal party, through insisting that the new government comply 
with the better or best SER standards of a former social-democratic government? Of course it 
is the inverse that should really bother European social-democrats here: Should one allow a 
judiciary to annul a social democratic electoral victory – in these “neo-liberalising climates” 
such victories are bound to be precarious, to make matters worse – by insisting that it keeps up 
the economic liberty standards of its neo-liberal predecessors? The point is that in both these 
scenarios judges would ultimately be confronted again with a conflict between best economic 
liberty governmental practices and best SER governmental practices in the face of which they 
can hardly avoid displacing and replacing democratic government on the basis of some kind of 
substantive due process “balancing” of rights. To avoid this, the DLBC argument would 
probably want to introduce another approach to (and criterion for) the judicial questioning of 
governmental practices that is contemplated here. Here is how it might want to conclude: 
 
DLBC requires strict judicial compliance with the Hohfeldian principle that not only 
fundamental SER, but all fundamental “rights” – broad and aspirational as they are usually cast 
in constitutional documents or frameworks – remain generally injusticiable. Only specific 
interpretations of fundamental rights – by either governments or private persons (allowed or 
licensed by law or government) – enter the realm of justiciability. Seen from this perspective, 
non-justiciability need not unleash the abdication leg of Michelman’s “standard worry” and 
may indeed go a long way towards keeping the usurpation leg firmly anchored as well. But this 
might seem not to be enough, for if one cannot review a governmental practice by comparing 
it either to previous governmental practices or by judging it in view of the substantive contents 
of a “right” or a substantive “balancing of rights,” how can one question that practice at all? 
Here is where the DLBC question shows its classical orientation: A governmental practice can 
only be delegitimised if it can be judged to be “inappropriate,” “irrational” or “unnecessary,” 
as explained above. The last two criteria would have to turn on very specific empirical evidence 
that is duly pleaded in court, rejection or acceptance of which can hardly involve significant 
political considerations. The first criterion – appropriateness – does involve a substantive 
judgment, and indeed the direct justiciability of a broad aspirational principle or “right,” and 
for this reason should be approached negatively. 
 
At issue under the criterion of appropriateness is not the judgment of governmental practices 
in view of best or better practices that have emerged earlier, but (startling as this may sound) 
in view of the “worst acceptable governmental practice” conceivable. At stake here is the 
possible proscription of governmental practices that destroy the “minimum content” of a 
constitutional aspiration or “right” in a way that “self-evidently”71 makes a mockery of that 
aspiration or “right.”72 The strict negativity of this DLBC conception of “inappropriateness” 
                                                     
71 This “self-evidently” opens a considerable can of words that cannot be addressed here, apart from stating that 
it relates to the Kelsenian or Jeffersonian constructionism discussed above. For a more extensive discussion, see 
VAN DER WALT, THE HORIZONTAL EFFECT REVOLUTION 369-379. 
72 In other words, no legislation and no governmental programme may optimise one constitutional principle at the 
complete expense of another. Such optimisation would belie the irreducible ambiguity (and therefore openness) 
of social co-existence that the Constitution seeks to sustain. This is still the message that I would like to take from 
should generally suffice to keep courts out of government in well-functioning and healthy 
democracies. From a DLBC perspective, widespread or frequent findings of 
“inappropriateness” would be a sure indication of either a democracy that has fallen gravely 
ill, or of a court that is simply malfunctioning. 
 
The last question that one should ask from this perspective (for now), is whether the 
constitutional guarantee to a social minimum does not in fact envisage nothing more than the 
minimum standard of the “worst acceptable governmental practice.” Is it not rather obvious 
that – in a democracy, at least – a governmental act or programme only becomes 
“inappropriate” when it self-evidently falls foul of the standard of the “worst acceptable 
governmental practice”? This question can only be posed here. Any attempt to respond 
properly to it would have to wait for another opportunity to do so, for such a response would 
have to look properly into the conditions for a substantive construction of the “self-evidence” 
of this “inappropriateness.” An early guess would nevertheless be that a whole range of answers 
to this question of “self-evident inappropriateness” should be considered possible. Judiciaries 
of some countries – the wealthy ones with stable and well-developed governmental capacities 
– would not be able to steer away from findings of self-evident inappropriateness when a 
government fails to comply with social minimum guarantees in a way that is evidently 
incongruous with its governmental capacity. These judiciaries would seem to have the capacity 
to secure the fourth domino of LBC x SER, provided, of course, that a conception of justice 
(first domino), governmental legitimacy (second domino) and clear constitutional embodiment 
(third domino) are all in place. For many countries, however, lack of resources and 
governmental capacity would invariably cause the fourth domino to fall and knock back the 
first three (assuming they are in place and can be knocked back) if the SER standards were to 
be measured against the “worst acceptable governmental practice” standard of wealthier 
countries with greater governmental capacity. A different standard would have to be applied if 
the test were to make any sense. 
 
The criterion of the “worst acceptable governmental practice” may thus not be a universal 
standard. But unlike the notion of the “best governmental practice,” it allows plausible scope 
for non-political assessment of governmental performance that can be entrusted to judiciaries 
without raising the “standard worry,” wherever the test stands to be applied. Or perhaps one 
should rephrase more carefully: The criterion of the “worst acceptable governmental practice” 
allows more scope for non-political assessment of governmental performance than the criterion 
of “best governmental practice” allows for, and can therefore more justifiably be entrusted to 
judiciaries. This is so because the former is more likely to restrict scrutiny to concrete logistic 
considerations, whereas the latter is more likely and perhaps invariably bound to introduce 
thicker considerations of political aspiration into the equation. 
 
It is undoubtedly a rather soulless note on which this DLBC argument ends, to respond here 
much too briefly and unjustly to the invocation of “liberalism without soul” in Richard 
Mailey’s exquisite contribution to this volume. Michelman may well want to dissociate himself 
from the extreme soullessness to which my engagement with his arguments have led me. He 
may well think that I am taking things too far. He can be assured, however, that it is not him, 
but a rather too soulful judiciary on my doorstep – “too zealous,” is the word Rawls may have 
used – that has had led me to conclude in this way.     
 
                                                     
Michelman “Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts.” 66 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1-15 (2003) and from his writings 
discussed under Section III above. 
